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Exploring the trajectories of highly skilled migration 
law and policy in Japan and the UK 2 
Japan and the UK appear to have few commonalities in terms of their history of 
and approach to migration law and policy. However, strong similarities in their 4 
contemporary approaches can be detected. Migration sits at the very top of the 
national political agendas and both have undertaken successive, major policy 6 
reforms over the past decade. Both have governments publicly committed to 
policies to attract ‘highly skilled’ migrants, with a restrictive approach towards 8 
‘unskilled’ migrants. This article draws out the similarities and differences of 
migration law and policy in Japan and the UK via their respective legislative 10 
structures and policy trajectories on highly skilled migration. The article argues 
that Japan and the UK promote a market-driven model which enables highly skilled 12 
migration to be ‘sold’ to publics believed to be hostile to increased migration. Yet, 
the rapid changes in policy and revising of applicable rules often prevents the 14 
successful recruitment of highly skilled migrants to both countries. 
Key words: Highly skilled migration, migration policy, migration law, points-16 
based system, Japan, United Kingdom, Brexit 
Introduction 18 
Japan and the UK have both made attracting highly skilled migrants (HSMs) a 
cornerstone of their respective migration policies. The length of their status as economic 20 
powerhouses, their different experiences of historical migration flows, and their 
recognition of (super)diversity in contemporary society differ. Yet, shared contemporary 22 
phenomena such as aging populations, colonial histories and national debates on how to 
resist or react to global patterns of migration have led both countries to undertake major 24 
reforms in recent years. Migration is a constant, salient political feature in both countries, 




with a restrictive approach towards ‘unskilled’ migration. 1  Both have underlined a 
‘hostile environment’ for those in an irregular status (Kitagawa and Tanno, 2016; 2 
Goodfellow, 2019, also Kato, Kuznetsova and Sigona, this issue) and their resistance to 
asylum-seeking (see Phillimore et.al., this issue).  4 
This article explores the respective trajectories which have led to the 
contemporary emphasis on HSM (highly skilled migration) as the cornerstone of 6 
migration policy in both Japan and the UK. The routes to this similar end-point differ, as 
does the success of policies and regulatory frameworks that both have put in place. By 8 
tracing the dynamism of law and policy through three phases, we analyse the means by 
which both countries use migration law and policy to pursue broadly similar aims. After 10 
setting out how Japan and the UK can be seen in the global context of migration and 
national migration systems, the article examines the legislative frameworks and 12 
trajectories of policies on HSM in both countries to contour the longitudinal legal 
framework of migration. The final part analyses our finding that the two countries 14 
promote a market-driven model which enables HSM to be ‘sold’ to publics who are 
perceived to be generally hostile to migration, though with limited success.  16 
Japan and the UK in the Global Migration Context 
The few case studies that compare Japan and the UK conclude that both have restrictive 18 
approach in migration policies as ‘insular’ states (e.g. Phillimore, Liu-Farrer and Sigona, 
this issue; Strausz, 2019; Layton-Henry, 1992). Both share common challenges in terms 20 
 
1 We do not regard ‘unskilled’ as an appropriate characterisation of migrants who falls outside 
the ‘highly skilled’ category. We use the term here because it is the official term used by both 




of a shortage of skilled and unskilled labour, but resist (or attempt to resist) high(er) levels 
of immigration. Much of the recent discussion on UK immigration has focussed on the 2 
consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’) and subsequent end to EU 
free movement of workers. UK government discourse since 2016 has centred on the 4 
mantra of ‘taking back control’ of immigration law and policy, including borders (see e.g. 
Donmez and Sutton, 2020, Slaven and Boswell, 2019). This discourse, inherited from the 6 
campaign to leave the EU, often rests on inaccurate characterisations of an unrestricted 
immigration policy as a consequence of EU membership and free movement principles. 8 
EU law does not cover migration from outside the EU and all Member States (including 
the UK) have used law and policy to regulate migration during the whole period of EU 10 
membership. In the post-Brexit regime, such tools are now applied to (potential) EU 
migrants to the UK too, which makes contemporary analysis and comparison of the UK 12 
and Japan pertinent. As both the UK and Japan witness a diversification of their societies 
(Phillimore, Liu-Farrer and Sigona, this issue), there is value in drawing out what the 14 
approaches to migration law and policy from two geographically distant, but major global 
economic players can tell us. 16 
Long-standing restrictive migration policies in Japan have attracted significant 
scholarly attention. Bartram (2000, 2005) contends that Japan in 1960s and 70s 18 
represented a ‘negative case’ where the migrant ratio in the workforce had been 
considerably lower than the other industrial economies while the economic growth had 20 
been fully achieved. He advocated the necessity of researching into the ‘negative case’ 
which the existing migration theories developed in the Western economies cannot 22 
explain.  
Bartram’s (2000, 2005) argument has been principally developed in the area of 24 




restrictions, that is to say without settlement or family reunification rights. Other scholars 
have pointed to the culture of ‘developmental states’ as the key factor predicating the 2 
restrictive stances (Seol and Screntny, 2009; Skrentny and Lee, 2015; Lee, 2018; Tian, 
2019). The concept of ‘developmental states’ (coined by Johnson (1982)) originally 4 
instantiates the systematic and powerful bureaucracy in central governments playing the 
fundamental role in initiating industrial growth. The politics of developmental states also 6 
characterise immigration models in East Asia as those where migrants’ human rights are 
sacrificed in favour of economic growth. Seol and Skrentny (2009: 607) articulate that 8 
‘Just as there is Asian model of development …there is an Asian model of immigration 
policy: low skilled migrants can work but they cannot bring family members and cannot, 10 
except in rare circumstances, settle’. Japan can be understood in this context, though the 
analysis below shows that it has shifted towards ‘skilled’ migration programmes that are 12 
increasingly common in global migration regimes (Cerna and Chou, 2014; Harvey, 
2014).  14 
Within the context of skilled migration debates, Japan and the UK serve as useful 
examples in comparing their respective policies. First, Castles, de Haas and Miller (2014) 16 
categorise Japan and the UK within the group of ‘immigration countries’. They differ 
from ‘traditional immigration countries’ (e.g., US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) 18 
where major proportions of contemporary populations were settled through large-scale 
immigration over several generations; and emigrant countries (e.g., China, and many 20 
African countries). The characterisation of ‘immigration country’ implies those which 
tend to keep positive net migration flows over the long term. Immigration countries are 22 
likely to focus on labour, while family reunification sits closer to the centre of migration 




Therefore, despite their geographical distance, contemporary Japan and the UK 
share a basic foundation on labour migration policies. Both are high-income economies 2 
and innovation leaders. Specifically, the countries focus on high-specification 
manufacturing rather than assembling. Hence, both countries emphasise the need of 4 
scientific specialists, which has been the building-block of their migration policies in 
2010s (Migration Advisory Committee [MAC], 2010; Koudo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi, 6 
2009). As a result, Japan and the UK are also global competitors in attracting HSMs. 
Nevertheless, the Japan-UK bilateral relationship has long since been strong: attempts by 8 
the Thatcher government in the 1980s succeeded in convincing Japanese companies to 
invest in the UK (as a gateway to the EU single market), of which the best-known 10 
examples are the car factories (Suzuki, 2020). The strength of the Japan-UK bilateral 
relationship is manifested in the choice of migration policies. The Points-Based system 12 
(PBS) was introduced in Japan by referring to the UK equivalent (Koudo jinzai suishin 
kaigi, 2009). However, the recent UK–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership 14 
Agreement in 2020 does not substantially facilitate any form of migration between the 
two (Cardwell, 2020). 16 
Until the present day, the major difference in migration law and policy between 
Japan and the UK had been the result of the UK’s membership of the EU. Free movement 18 
of workers between EU Member States is a core part of the Single Market, but the UK’s 
attempts before the referendum to ‘unpick’ this failed (Cardwell, 2016). Having left the 20 
EU, the UK Parliament passed the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU 
Withdrawal) Act 2020, which extended the PBS to EU citizens. Therefore, in 2021 the 22 
UK finds itself in a more directly comparable situation to Japan in which HSMs are 




Migration legislation in Japan and the UK 
Japan and UK have complex and multi-layered migration law and regulatory frameworks 2 
that rely on primary, secondary/delegated, and quasi-legislation. The high place migration 
occupies on the political agenda tends to lead to frequent changes to (executive-led) 4 
secondary and quasi-legislation. This section provides a picture of the immigration 
legislation in Japan and the UK, subsequently showing how they share similar 6 
motivations in controlling migration and legislative outputs. 
Legislative frameworks 8 
The legal architecture of migration in both Japan and the UK is built upon Immigration 
Acts as the core primary legislation. For Japan, this is the Immigration Control and 10 
Refugee Recognition Act (hereafter Immigration Act).2 The respective UK law is the 
Immigration Act 1971. UK immigration and citizenship law is not devolved to Scotland, 12 
Wales or Northern Ireland.3 Both Acts confer on the Minister of Justice (Japan) and the 
Home Secretary (UK) wide powers to make secondary legislation to prescribe conditions 14 
and procedures, and individual decisions on immigration. The structure of immigration 
legislation is thus hierarchical and, although there is no space here to analyse the large 16 
amount of secondary legislation, its importance to migration governance should not be 
underestimated. Similarly, the court systems in Japan and the UK play important roles in 18 




2 This article follows the practice of not labelling the established year with the law when referring 
to Japanese legislation (Sellek, 2001, Sato, 2017). However, the Act was first passed in 1951. 




Table 1 legislative structure of immigration control in Japan and the UK 
Types of 


























Notifications Government Circulars Operational Guidance 
Source: Immigration Act (Japan), Immigration Act 1971 (UK), Immigration (Leave to Enter 2 
and Remain) Order 2000, Immigration Rules: Parts 1 to 14. 
 4 
Both in Japan and the UK, immigrants must have a visa (‘entry clearance’ in the UK) to 
work.4 A visa, however, is just one condition to obtain a permit to enter and reside in the 6 
country (IOM, 2011). The Japanese Act establishes that an immigrant can reside lawfully 
only by being given a permit from the Immigration Authority. This is called ‘status of 8 
residence’. Its equivalent is ‘leave to enter’ (or ‘remain’) in the UK. The visa statistics 
may not however represent the whole population of documented immigrants residing in 10 
the countries: there may be individuals who obtained a visa but were refused entry on 
other grounds, or obtained a visa but did not migrate. 5  Table 2 encapsulates the 12 
differences between visa and status of residence/leave to enter/remain. 
Table 2: visa and entry process in Japan and the UK 14 
 Step 1 Visa 
 Step 2 
 Immigration control 
  Step 3 
  Lawful status given 
Japan Obtain visa Examined by an 
immigration officer at 
a port of entry 





An entry clearance having 
effect as leave to enter 
(remain) 
 
4 Except for EU/EEA citizens (before 31 December 2020) or Irish citizens. 




Source: Immigration Act (Japan), Immigration Act 1971 (UK) 
 2 
The above table represents how to gain residential status in the host country. This is only 
one part of the processes needed to settle. Japan and the UK do not offer a route to 4 
permanent residency at the first instance of their entry, unlike other countries such as 
Australia and Canada (sometimes referred to as ‘settler states’ (Dauvergne, 2016)). Both 6 
countries require further, stringent conditions for settlement, as we discuss later. 
Legislation in Japan 8 
In Japan, there are currently 29 classifications of status of residence which give foreign 
nationals legal grounds to reside for more than three months. The status of residence can 10 
be grouped into two types: activities or kinship. A status based on activities is restricted 
to those permitted by the Minister of Justice. Vetting of individuals and their sponsors is 12 
followed by the granting of permission only within the parameters of the activities 
allowed. These include studying and traineeships, but the interest here is on those who 14 
gain permission to work. There are three sub-groups within this category. First, foreign 
officials including diplomats. Second, and the focus here, HSMs (including business 16 
managers, legal or accounting services, medical services, researchers, instructors, 
engineers/specialists in humanities/international services, intra-company transferees, care 18 
specialists, entertainers and chefs). Third, ‘specified skilled workers’6. Table 3 shows the 
number of HSMs entering Japan in 2018. The status of residence ‘Engineer, Specialist in 20 
Humanities/International Services’ is the most representative category of HSMs. 
 




Table 3 newly arrived HSMs in 20187 
Professor 3,194 
Artist 435 
Religious Activities 872 
Highly Skilled Professionals (i.e. through 
PBS) 
531 
Business manager 1,790 
Researcher 368 
Instructor (e.g. language instructors) 3,432 
Engineer, Specialist in Humanities/ 
International Services 
34,182 
Intra-company transferee 9,478 
Skilled labour (e.g chefs) 3,551 
other HSMs 103 
total 57,936 
Source: Immigration Services Agency (2019) 2 
 
 By contrast, residence based on kinship focusses on the relationship between the 4 
individual and Japan. This includes the spouse or child of Japanese citizens or permanent 
residents. It is therefore possible some of those exercising highly skilled professions 6 
gained their residency through this route, but they are not included in the statistics. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this article we are only focussing on the HSM route, whilst 8 
recognising the limitations of doing so. 
 To obtain a HSM visa, a job offer is indispensable though no labour market test 10 
is required. The detailed conditions in defining ‘highly skilled’ depend on each status of 
residence, predicated on Ministerial Ordinances, two standards need to be satisfied: the 12 
equivalent of graduate degree (or relevant 10-year professional career) and expected 
remuneration, comparable to a Japanese counterpart. Migrants can be accompanied by a 14 
 
7 .  As UK statistics are only available in flow data shown in Table 4, we also cited the flow data 
here to compare the figures of both countries. We find that the stock data of HSMs represents 
the true picture of HSMs. Entertainers are not in the table as they tend to stay short-term (the 




spouse, but not family members such as parents.8 No language test is required although 
some jobs, including medical doctors, demand a prerequisite qualification in Japanese. 2 
Unlike the UK, no quota nor limit on length of stay applies. Individuals may apply for 
permanent residency after ten consecutive years of residence, except in a few cases. This 4 
requirement is stricter than other Asian high-income countries, such as the five-year 
minimum in South Korea and Taiwan. 6 
Legislation in the UK 
The central piece of immigration law in the UK is the Immigration Act 1971. The Act’s 8 
central concept is the ‘right of abode’ (section 1) for British citizens, and the subjecting 
of all those who do not fall into this category to the provisions of the Act (section 3). The 10 
Act is amended on an almost annual basis. Reflecting the political salience of 
immigration, the regularity of changes and the impact of case-law interpreting the 12 
provisions has resulted in an area of law of extreme complexity. Practitioner handbooks 
on UK Immigration Law (e.g. Phelan et al., 2018) run to over 2000 pages. 14 
The other main source of immigration law in the UK is EU law. Until the UK left 
the EU on 31 January 2020, EU citizens were covered by the free movement rights 16 
guaranteed under the EU Treaties (Articles 26 and 45, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU)). EU law has gradually evolved from a focus on workers to a more holistic 18 
approach for EU citizens and their family members (Shaw and Miller, 2012). EU law 
applied within the UK until the end of the transition period (31 December 2020), after 20 
which the provisions of UK immigration law now apply to EU citizens (see Peers, 2020). 
 
8 Except for the category of ‘Highly Skilled Professionals’ who are granted to bring their parents 




The Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 ended free 
movement rights and subjects EU citizens to the same regime as for non-EU citizens. 2 
 A long-term migrant resident obtains the leave to enter/remain, which from 2021 
includes EU citizens. The PBS, put in place by the Labour government in 2008, was set 4 
out in ‘tiers’, which replaced a previous system of work permits. There have been 
numerous changes since then, to the extent that the PBS is ‘difficult to navigate 6 
successfully’ (Clayton and Firth, 2018). Tiers consisted of: 1 (entrepreneur, investor or 
‘exceptional talent’); 2 (skilled); 3 (unskilled); 4 (students) and 5 (temporary/youth 8 
mobility, e.g. working holidays). Tier 3 was never used since migration from the EU, 
especially after the EU enlargements in 2004 to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 10 
largely fulfilled domestic need. Tier 1 was originally to be used by HSMs without a job 
offer or sponsor, but this option was closed by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 12 
government in 2010 and gradually replaced by more specific sub-categories (discussed 
below) (Gower, 2015). 14 
 Therefore, the UK equivalent of HSMs in Japan is primarily Tier 2. Like Japan, it 
is possible that HSMs enter the UK through other routes, and so it is important to note 16 
that the data will not necessarily capture everyone with the same levels of skills.  
To obtain a Tier 2 visa, an applicant must hold a job offer from an employer. Tier 18 
2 visas are intended to be used only when a vacancy cannot be filled by a UK worker, 
therefore, a labour market test is required unless the job appears on a list of ‘shortage’ 20 
occupations which is updated regularly. The applicant must be ‘skilled’, defined as being 
at graduate level, paid above £30,000 per year (£20,800 for entrants under 26), pass an 22 
English test and pay the fee (between £232 and £1220). Fees are reduced where there is 
a shortage of workers according to a published list, often including engineers, doctors, 24 




five years. To reside longer, they are required to gain permanent residency (‘indefinite 
leave to remain’) with conditions including a citizenship test and an annual salary 2 
threshold of £36,200 (in 2020). Only 6% of Tier 2 migrants entering in 2013 gained 
permanent residency (MAC, 2020). Table 4 shows the figure of HSMs entering UK in 4 
2018; Tier 2 General and intra-company transfer are the two major routes of HSMs. 
Table 4 Newly arrived HSMs in UK (2018) 6 
Tier 1 Tier 1: Entrepreneur 790 
 General 215 
 Investors 115 
 Post-study 50 
 Exceptional Talent. 165 
Tier 2 General 25,000 
 Intra-company Transfer 20,500 
 Minister of Religion 695 
 Sportsperson 1,310 
 total 48,840 
Source: Home Office (2019) 
The trajectory of migration policies in Japan and the UK 8 
HSM policies have been developed as part of a global ‘war for talent’ which began to 
appear in the 1990s (Chambers et al., 1998; Beechler and Woodward, 2009). In this 10 
section, we break down the development into three phases, which are predicated on the 
respective societal, economic and political backgrounds in Japan and the UK. In so doing, 12 
we place the HSM changes in the wider context of migration debates (e.g. unskilled 
migration for Japan and EU free movement for the UK).  14 
Japan’s three phases in skilled migration policies 
The Japanese government started to proactively seek HSMs from 1988. We term this the 16 
beginning of phase 1 (1988-2000). Until the late 1980s, Japan’s official stance was that 
it needed no migration, as the existing workforce covered labour demand (Mori, 1997; 18 




economy and labour shortages. The government drastically changed its policy orientation 
and endorsed the third Basic Employment Measures Plan in June 1988. This plan adopted 2 
a new policy to admit HSMs whilst restricting unskilled migration: 
Japan accepts foreign labour of the expert/technical sectors more proactively 4 
than ever to revitalise the socio-economy and promote 
internationalisation…Regarding unskilled labour…it is essential to cope with 6 
the issue with thorough deliberation based on a consensus among the 
Japanese people. (Japanese Government, 1988) 8 
This decision has remained unchanged, with its core principle defining Japan’s long-term 
official stance (e.g., Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 2015b). Nevertheless, this official 10 
position has not prevented the government from increasing the number of unskilled 
migrants as guest workers through various mechanisms, such as the Technical Training 12 
Internship Programme, to fill labour shortages (Roberts, 2017; Surak, 2018). Given the 
fundamental change in direction in 1988, the Immigration Act was drastically amended 14 
in 1989 and expanded the categories of status of residence for HSMs, for example by 
creating a new status for intra-company transferees and medical professionals. This 16 
amendment also introduced a new status of ‘long-term resident’, primarily for Nikkeijin 
(overseas citizens of Japanese descent) to allow them to work with fewer restrictions. The 18 
majority of literature focuses on this Nikkeijin policy change with regard to 1989 reform 
(e.g. Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004; Tian, 2019), but it was also an important turning point 20 
for HSM policy.  
Phase 2 (2000-2012) began to respond to Japan’s social and industrial changes. 22 
After the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, the government realised the 
necessity of upgrading its industrial structure to higher-value, IT-driven models based on 24 
global supply chains. The MOJ (2000) declared in its 2nd Basic Plan for Immigration 




international social needs’, pointing to the necessity to develop IT industries. For this 
purpose, the government gradually relaxed the conditions and facilitated the 2 
administrative processes for HSMs. For example, adopting the mutual recognition of IT 
engineering qualifications with Asian economies9 enabled Japanese companies to hire 4 
HSMs with no tertiary degree. As HSMs had been defined as being at graduate level, this 
policy change brought about a novel approach in identifying skills. Employers also 6 
enjoyed a measure to shorten the examining process, as the MOJ declared the aim for two 
weeks (now 10 days) for a decision if a worker is hired by a company listed on the 8 
Japanese stock exchange or equivalent (MOJ, 2015a; Wakisaka, 2018). 
Japan’s population started to decline in 2008, prompting the government to 10 
consider migration to sustain the economy against the background of one of the world’s 
lowest birth rates. However, the government was not eager to change the fundamental 12 
rule to only accept HSMs (Immigration Services Agency, 2019). The policy priority has 
remained focussed on attracting HSMs rather than unskilled migrants to increase the 14 
working-age population in Japan. Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), representing 
Japan’s large enterprises, has constantly advocated for increasing the number of HSMs, 16 
while remaining relatively low-key on unskilled migration (Keidanren, 2008).  
In 2009, the government’s Council for the Promotion of Acceptance of Highly 18 
Skilled Professionals produced a ground-breaking proposal to boost the number of HSMs 
by introducing the ‘Points-Based Preferential Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign 20 
Professionals’ (PBS). Council members included representatives from labour unions, 
who were strongly against accepting unskilled migrants (see, for example, the meeting 22 
 
9 These economies were identified as Singapore, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, 




minutes of Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi, 2009). The PBS was finally implemented in 
2012. 2 
The PBS was the Japanese government’s first proactive policy to attract and retain 
HSMs. The formal name of the system is ‘Points-based Preferential Immigration 4 
Treatment for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals’. As the name indicates, it provides 
migrants approved to be ‘Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals’ with preferential 6 
treatment, such as fast track permanent residency, not granted to other migrants. 
Phase 2 is an important period in that the government changed its policies to treat 8 
HSMs as potential immigrants rather than guest workers; therefore, not only entry but 
also settlement policies were discussed and developed from this period (MOJ, 2000). 10 
However, these reforms remained rather cosmetic, leading to technical revisions without 
amending laws. In other words, the government mainly relied on the reforms of secondary 12 
and quasi-legislation. This may be attributed to the fact that the Japanese political system 
was unstable in the latter half of the phase with a hung parliament from 2007 and change 14 
of ruling party from 2009. It can be argued that the legislative reforms were not possible 
because of the political turmoil, subsequently the overall reforms stayed low-key 16 
(Musashi, 2013). Nevertheless, more importantly, there was no drastic policy change 
even though the ruling party changed from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (right-18 
leaning) to Democratic Party (left-leaning) in 2009 when the hung parliament was 
temporarily resolved with a coalition of the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic 20 
Party being in the majority. This suggests a political change did not necessarily influence 
migration policies in Japan.  22 
Phase 3 (2013-present) represents a period of more economically-driven 
migration policy-making. The government situated HSMs centrally in its economic 24 




on the series of economic reforms (often known as ‘Abenomics’).10 His reforms included 
upgrading the PBS, as it fell behind the expectations (Oishi, 2014). The number of 2 
migrants through the PBS route was only 434 for the initial 11 months, accounting for 
0.2% of the total number of HSMs. The government acknowledged the faults of the initial 4 
scheme (Immigration Services Agency, 2019). Measures included lowering the salary 
threshold and giving more generous exclusive packages such as fast-track permanent 6 
residency in only one year. Thanks to this upgrade, approval figures skyrocketed from 
579 in June 2013 to 18,286 in June 2019 (Immigration Services Agency, 2019). The goal 8 
to increase to 10,000 at the end of 2020 (Japanese government, 2017) was achieved three 
years early.  10 
Parallel to the PBS reforms, Parliament amended the Immigration Act in 2014 to 
streamline the categories of status of residence, which allows HSMs to have more flexible 12 
choice in choosing their career in Japan. In the former systems, the status of residence of 
an ‘engineer’ (for those with a scientific degree) and ‘specialist in 14 
humanities/international services’ (for those with a humanities/social sciences/law 
degree) were clearly separated. However, the university degree did not necessarily 16 
represent actual careers. For example, an engineer graduate may work as an investment 
banker which was generally deemed as a ‘specialist in humanities/international services’. 18 
This inappropriate categorization sometimes discouraged migrants from pursuing a 
different career from their graduate degrees. 20 
 
10 ‘Abenomics’ are comprised of (1) robust monetary policies by the Central Bank, (2) the large-





Overall, the reforms in the phase 3 are characterized by two points. First, active 
‘attracting’ of HSMs rather than passive ‘receiving’ was brought to the fore in policies. 2 
Amid the global race for talent, the government gradually recognised that they are in a 
competition with other states to attract HSMs (Prime Minister’s Office, 2020). Second, 4 
these reforms are more drastic than the previous phase, requiring the amendment of laws 
rather than minor revisions. In summary, Phase 3 is the period when Japan recognised the 6 
limitations of its approach and made efforts, both in terms of reforming the legislation 
and changing the basis of the policy, to attract HSMs via more attractive and flexible 8 
packages. In this respect, the government’s claim of success of the changes (Immigration 
Services Agency, 2019) appears to demonstrate that Japan was serious about increasing 10 
the take-up of its PBS route, and that changes were not merely cosmetic. 
UK’s three phases in skilled migration policies 12 
Unlike Japan, the UK proactively encouraged migration from its (former) colonies after 
World War Ⅱ to fill labour shortages. But a backlash against migration became a growing 14 
political issue from the 1960s and sparked a move to reduce and restrict migration routes 
(Layton-Henry, 1992). The post-war industrial context meant that attracting HSMs was 16 
not an express policy but one which emerged gradually over time. For the purposes of 
analysis here, for the UK the decade from 1997 to 2007 is Phase 1. The phase started 18 
when the Labour government of Tony Blair came into power and proactively reformed 
the policies to recruit HSMs from outside the EU. The Highly Skilled Migration 20 
Programme (HSMP) was introduced in 2002. 
The HSMP was based on a points system allocated to attributions including 22 
educational record, work experiences and earnings. With sufficient points, s/he was given 
permission to enter without a job offer for one year. The permit was renewable three 24 




requirement was to take active steps to be ‘economically active’ and thus there was no 
need to retain a highly-skilled job. In 2006, the programme was revised to require 2 
fulfilling the points in renewing the status. The points threshold was lifted from 65 to 75 
points. The government initially aimed to increase the number of medical doctors (via 4 
additional points) and MBA degree holders, but these targeted groups comprised only 2.8 
percent of all the successful applicants (MAC, 2020). 6 
Although the HSMP failed to deliver satisfactory outcomes by attracting HSMs 
in sufficient quantities (Home Office, 2007), the government continued policies to attract 8 
‘the best and brightest’. During the 2005 General Election campaign, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (2005) proposed ‘the type of points system used in Australia, for example, to 10 
help ensure our economy gets the skills we need’ (Blair, 2005) even though a PBS was 
already in place. As a result, the government introduced greater selectivity, and 12 
streamlined the 80+, complex immigration categories (Home Office, 2006). At this point, 
UK migration policies entered into a brief new phase. 14 
The newly-endorsed PBS represents the short-lived Phase 2 (2008-2010). The 
HSMP was replaced by a ‘tier’ system. Tiers 1 and 2 applied to those without and with a 16 
job offer respectively.11 Tier 1 required stricter conditions and higher number of points 
to be admitted and was expected to ‘widen the pool of highly skilled individuals and 18 
maintain labour market flexibility’ (MAC, 2020: 44). Unlike the HSMP, conditions such 
as English language proficiency were required. The points system became stricter in 2009 20 
 
11  Tier 1 had five categories: (1) General, (2) Entrepreneur, (3) Investor, (4) Persons of 
Exceptional Talent, (5) Post-study work. Each of them required different conditions and no 
job offer. Unless specified, this article describes Tier 1 (General)/Tier 2 (General) as they were 




to make it even more selective, but phase 2 was cut short due to the change in government 
to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, which turned the PBS from an 2 
‘admissionist’ to a ‘restrictionist’ mechanism as the new government turned its attention 
to reducing overall net migration.  4 
During Phase 3 (2010-present), the aim of PBS of attracting global talent was still 
present in political discourse about the value of migration to the UK. However, ever 6 
further limitations and conditions were placed. As Prime Minister (2010-2016), David 
Cameron went beyond merely trying to be selective, with a commitment at the heart of 8 
his political messaging to reduce net migration from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to ‘tens of 
thousands’ (Cameron, 2011). Since the UK was not able to control EU free movement, 10 
the target to reduce the net migration was thus primarily focused on non-EU migrants via 
work, study and family routes. Government policy referred to limiting the number of 12 
‘non-EU economic migrants’, without specifically mentioning HSMs (UK Government, 
2010). 14 
Thus, in 2010, the government tightened the conditions of the PBS, setting the 
minimum-required earnings to £25,000 p.a. and limiting the applicants to the post-16 
graduate degree for Tier 1.12 The points requirement was further raised (95 to 100). A 
maximum monthly quota of 600 visas was introduced and the government closed the new 18 
initial application of Tier 1 in April 2011. It was instead replaced by Tier 1 (‘exceptional 
talent’) in August 2011 but with much tighter restrictions to prove exceptional talents. 20 
Tier 1 (exceptional talent) had an annual cap of 1,000 which was doubled to 2,000 in 
2017 although it has never reached the limit. The largest annual number of successful 22 
applicants was approximately 600 in 2018. According to the MAC, an independent, 
 




public body that advises the government on migration, the low success rate was due to 
the strict conditions and procedures (MAC, 2020). At the same time, the UK government, 2 
along with others in the EU but unlike Japan, facilitates a route to residence via large 
investments (Dzankic, 2015; Parker, 2017). This has not been without accusations of 4 
allowing money stemming from corruption into the UK (Transparency International, 
2015).  6 
Public opinion on immigration in recent years in the UK has shifted, insofar as it 
was a headline issue from 2001 to 2016 and has since declined but remains salient 8 
(Blinder and Richards, 2020). Public opinion remains more favourable to HSM, with 
recent analysis showing that the British population attaches higher importance to skills 10 
than other factors, such as skin colour or religion (Heath and Richards, 2018; Blinder and 
Richards, 2020). The Conservative government elected in December 2019 made an 12 
explicit commitment to end EU free movement. As such, the Immigration and Social 
Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 has placed potential HSMs from the 14 
EU under the same non-EU regime. This effectively means that the UK has closed one of 
the major, straightforward HSM routes and imposed greater formalities on citizens from 16 
its neighbours (except Ireland) as well as outgoing UK migrants to the EU. The extension 
of the PBS to EU citizens is likely to herald a major shift in UK migration patterns and 18 
one which might reveal that the much-lauded PBS reflects emotionally-based, rather than 
economically-based, policy-making (Cardwell and Da Lomba, 2020). If this is the case, 20 
particularly if there is a decline in HSMs in the UK (caused by EU HSMs leaving) then 
we might expect the HSM regime to become more flexible in response. This, however, is 22 




Policy outcomes and challenges in Japan and the UK 
Japan and the UK appear to have arrived at a similar point: both have pursued successive 2 
policies changes with a view to attracting HSMs. And yet, the frequent changes to the 
legal provisions and categorisations, turning a stated policy into reality is more difficult. 4 
Recent success in Japan in increasing HSMs can be contrasted with the UK, where 
political leaders ostensibly flown the banner for attracting the ‘brightest and the best’, but 6 
have consistently tightened PBS restrictions. The post-Brexit extension of the PBS to EU 
citizens will test whether potential HSMs from nearby countries will be attracted to the 8 
UK. 
 10 
Table 5 long-term migration inflows by type (thousand) 




2018 66 31.9 0.1 17 NA 124.2 157.8 
2014 29.3 21.4 0.2 12.8 NA 82.5 98.7 
2010 19.3 21.9 0.4 14.1 NA 63.5 51.7 
UK 
2018 36.6 88.7 25.2 32.7 159.5 330.9 NA 
2014 79.2 64.4 17.2 22.4 128.2 missing NA 
2010 84 64.7 21.3 22.3 98.3 234 NA 
*’Work’ includes HSM schemes in both countries but encompasses other categories as 12 
well (e.g. Tier 5 in the UK); therefore, the numerical data is different from Table 3 and 4. 
** International students and trainees are temporary migrants in OECD figures. 14 
***Trainees are mostly technical interns in Japan. 
Source: OECD (2012-2020) 16 
 
Table 5 depicts the recent inflows of migrants to Japan and the UK sums up our findings, 18 




states13.  The inflow of ‘work’ migrants into Japan has tripled from 2010 (Phase 2) to 
2018 (Phase 3), whereas that of UK has more than halved. Although the UK government 2 
tightened the entry of HSMs through the PBS scheme as discussed, this policy may have 
instead increased the number of EU migrants via free movement (over 50% increase from 4 
2014 to 2018) as their substitutes (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2014). This indicated that 
despite its rhetoric, the UK government could not ‘control’ migration in the way its 6 
official rhetoric suggested. 
Meanwhile, the statistics suggest that Japan has been successful in attracting 8 
HSMs. However, the overall picture of migration inflow offers other implications. The 
number of trainees (i.e. technical interns) has risen steeply, far outnumbering HSMs. 10 
Despite the prioritisation of HSMs, the data indicates trainees as less-skilled migrants 
were in fact much successful in migrating to Japan. In sum, the policies on HSMs are 12 
mixed in terms of their success despite the political emphasis placed on this migration 
route. 14 
Relating to the skill arguments, both countries remain in a transitional period of 
major policy shifts. As already shown, EU citizens must now use the PBS route, but its 16 
outcomes are unclear. From 2019 to 2020, the UK government expanded the Shortage 
Occupation List, encompassing more migrants in healthcare and IT sectors to respond to 18 
the labour shortages, in addition to abolishing market tests and quotas in the occupations 
 
13 While Japan’s statistics are complete survey from the immigration control, UK adopts sampling 
survey which is less reliable. EU free movement makes it more difficult to grasp UK’s 
migration data precisely. Therefore, we used OECD data which was, to the extent possible, 




listed. These reforms respond to employers’ needs who have struggled to secure sufficient 
labour (MAC, 2020). 2 
 In 2019, labour shortages prompted Japan to launch a new programme called 
‘specified skilled workers (SSW)’ which ‘stretched the bottom tier of the ‘skill’ category’ 4 
(Oishi, 2020; 7). SSW has two sub-categories: SSW1 (as equivalent to graduate technical 
interns, i.e., not HSMs but with three-year professional experiences compared to 10-6 
years); and, SSW2 (as equivalent to HSMs with eligibility to bring family members and 
gain permanent residency on the same conditions)14. While SSW1 has 14 sectors to work 8 
(e.g. care, food service industries), SSW2 has only 2 (construction and shipbuilding/ship 
machinery). Although the new programme was much anticipated by stakeholders 10 
including industries and local communities suffering from acute labour shortages, the 
number of SSW1 as of 2020 remains 15,663, comprising only 4.5% of the target for the 12 
initial 5 years (Immigration Services Agency, 2020). No SSW2 were granted since its 
screening criteria and application processes remain undefined after two years of 14 
implementation.  
The shifts in Japan and UK reveal the challenges of ‘skill’ arguments in that they 16 
are closely related to labour shortages; it is unclear, once the labour shortages are 
alleviated, migrants through the new schemes become non-HSMs. For example, SSW is 18 
the first ‘skill’ programme in Japan defined by labour shortages, but the COVID-19 
pandemic has suddenly relieved the shortages in the hospitality industries. As a result, 20 
there are only 67 SSW1 migrants in the hotel industry (initial target: 22,000) and 998 in 
food service industries (target: 53,000) in 2020. It is quite telling that policy-makers are 22 
 
14 SSW 2 should have ‘proficient skills’ while SSW 1’s skills ‘require considerable knowledge 




in fact more interested in labour rather than skill shortages, while ostensibly emphasizing 
the latter. 2 
Another important lesson from the recent reforms is that the definition of ‘skill’ 
can be conveniently defined and fluid. Both Japan and UK have traditionally defined 4 
HSMs as either with university degree or sufficient professional careers, but the 
parameters are flexibly tuned in line with various needs, particularly labour demands. The 6 
fact is that ‘skill’ is context dependent and fluidly (un)created by market as there is no 
universal definitions on skill which is after all the product of social and political 8 
construction (Kofman and Raghuram, 2015; Oishi, 2020). Our analysis calls for more 
scrutiny on ever-increasing ‘skill’ debates without taking policy reforms at face value. 10 
Conclusion 
Comparing Japan and the UK in terms of migration is undoubtedly marked by more 12 
generalised conclusions about the approaches to migration in the round and diversity. In 
respect of the latter, there are marked differences between the two countries: whereas 14 
cultural and ethnic diversity has long been recognised as an integral part of the make-up 
of the UK, Japan is only making the first steps on this path (see Laurence and Igarashi, 16 
this issue). 
If some of the historical and cultural context for their respective approaches to 18 
migration is put to one side, the law and policy on HSM can be seen to be remarkably 
similar. Japan and the UK’s approach to HSM is, in official discourse, reliant on the 20 
positive economic effects of HSM and fulfilling particular needs that cannot be met 
adequately within the countries. Both countries present themselves as welcoming to those 22 
with skills, whilst appearing to downplay any negative popular reaction to increasing 
migration. This is done by suggesting that HSMs are, by its very nature, a self-selecting 24 




integrate into society. This in turn makes the immigration argument easier to ‘sell’ to 
populations who are believed to be sceptical or hostile to any actions that would seem to 2 
lead to an increase in migration. The discourse on borders and controlling are powerful 
in the context of both Britain and Japan being island nations, a readily visible feature of 4 
discourse in both countries. 
Attempting to achieve the aims of attracting HSMs via frequent law and policy 6 
changes reveals strong similarities between Japan and the UK. In both, the core legal 
architecture remains rather stable, but the secondary legislation is subject to many 8 
changes. In both the UK and Japan, over the past 15 years changes have been made by 
newly elected governments soon after taking power: this appears to reflect the political 10 
saliency of migration rather than a need (economic or otherwise) to make the immigration 
system ‘work’ for migrants or potential migrants. Indeed, in both Japan and the UK, 12 
migration policy appears to follow a trajectory of trying to attract potential HSMs whilst 
also resisting (overt) liberalisation.  14 
In neither country have the explicit aims on HSM been expressly fulfilled. This 
brings the argument (almost) full circle: if the policies put in place were left to develop 16 
over time, rather than being subject to more rapid changes by governments keen to show 
that they are ‘doing’ something, then a longer-term perspective on how migration could 18 
be better governed would be possible. The legal structures surrounding migration are, in 
both countries, flexible and highly reliant on the powers of the respective governments to 20 
change as they see fit. The end of free movement in the UK is the most recent and 
significant change likely to have an impact on migration to (and from) the UK. This 22 
measure has been promoted as a headline UK government commitment to ‘take back 
control’ of immigration and borders after Brexit. Governments are thus able to respond 24 




changes including ‘tightening up’ of the systems. The problem in doing so is that any 
gains might be short-term: the evidence in this article is that both countries have launched 2 
initiatives on HSM only to change them soon after. Since using HSM is a means to 
confront longer-term problems such as population decline and ensuring economic 4 
competitiveness, then frequent changes and ever-increasingly complexity seem less likely 
to meet these aims than those for domestic (political) consumption.   6 
Thus, Japan and the UK appear to have arrived at the same point. Both are in need 
of attracting HSMs but unclear whether the law and policies will meet their aims. The 8 
respective policies appear to fall within the scope of a market-driven approach: that both 
provide attractive routes to HSMs in countries across the world who might consider 10 
pursuing such opportunities. Yet, there is an important caveat. A market-driven approach 
suggests an openness in the rhetoric about attracting HSMs, matched with a regulatory 12 
regime underlining its simplicity, speed and efficiency. Our analysis above shows that 
this is far from the case. Furthermore, given the emphasis on restricting other routes to 14 
migration, it may be that both countries are preventing themselves from confronting 
longer-term societal problems by pursuing shorter-term, political gains.  16 
Since there are a few signs that either Japan or the UK will embark on a wider-
scale liberalisation of migration policy, future research on HSM could investigate the 18 
extent to which geography, cultural or other factors affect the choices made by (potential) 
HSMs and uncover the links between, for example, attracting HSMs and citizenship. In 20 
this respect, there remain strong differences between the UK and Japan, in particular since 
the latter does not allow dual citizenship. Thus, to do so would necessitate a clearer 22 
understanding of the drivers, but also the changing patterns of where potential HSMs are 
located across the globe. In this respect, research on HSM has much to inform future law 24 




effective is necessary, whilst bearing in mind that continued politicised context of 
migration law and policy. At the same time, the success of attracting HSMs for both Japan 2 
and the UK depends on how both countries fare in the global ‘war for talent’. 
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